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STATE OF NEW YORK

SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of ROBERT C. DUNCAN,

Petitioner,
-againstTINAM. STANFORD, CHAIRWOMAN ofthe,
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civi1 Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # Ol-14-ST6254 Index No. 5323-14
Appearances:

Robert C. Duncan
Inmate No. 13B2467
Petitioner, Pro Se

Groveland Correctional Facility
7000 Sonyea Road

P.O. Box 50
Sonyea, New York 14556-0050
Eric T. Schneiderman

Attorney General
State ofNew York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol ·
Albany,·New York 12224
(Melissa A. Latino,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate currently housed at .Groveland Correctional Facility,
commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent
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dated March 25, 2014 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving
two concurrent indeterminate terms of 1 to 3 years for convictions of aggravated driving
while intoxicated. Among the arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indicates that he
has not been cited for any disciplinary infractions since during his current-incarceration. He
indicates he is currently in the ASAT program. He has a wife and child and his family
resides in Seneca County. He maintains that the Parole Board improperly denied parole
based upon the nature of the instant offense, with no consideration of his institutional
adjustment and progress. He contends that the Parole Board failed to follow the guidelines
set forth in Executive Law § 259-i. He indicates that the Parole Board never mentioned
whether or not release would so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine
respect for the law. He criticizes the Parole Board for not advising him with regard to how
he can improve his chances of being released. In his view, the Parole Board ,exceeded its
authority to such an extent that it was guilty of performing a judicial function by resentencing him to a longer term of imprisonment. He maintains that the Parole Board failed
to consider statutory factors favorable to his release.
The reasons for the respondent's determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:

"Denied - Hold for 24 months, Next appearance date: 03/2016
"Parole is denied for the following reasons. After a careful
review of the record and this interview, it is the determination of
this panel that if released at this time, there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without
violating the law and your release at this time is incompatible
2
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with the welfare and safety of the community This decision is
based on the following factors: the serious nature of the I.O. of
AGG DWI 1st (2 cts) involved you leaving the scene of a hit and
run accident while under the influence of alcohol. You were on
probation for a prior AGG DWI when you committed the I.O.
This is a pattern of your criminal history which includes
numerous drinking and driving related offenses. You were
removed from ASAT and denied an EEC for overall
unacceptable level of program participation. Your positive
programming, disciplinary record, risk to the community,
rehabilitative efforts, needs for a successful re-entry, sentencing
minutes and required factors are also considered. However,
discretionary release is not appropriate at this time as you
remain a substantial risk to public safety."

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory

requirements, notreviewable(MatterofDelrosariov Evans, 121AD3d1152, 1152- 1153 [3d
Dept., 2014); Matter of Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 114 AD3d 992 [3d
Dept., 2014; Matter of Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 (3d Dept., 2013]).
Furthennore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part of the
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russov. New York StateBd. of Parole,
50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367; 1369 [3d
Dept., 2011]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the
discretionary detennination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]).
A review of the transcript ofthe parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant
offense, attention was paid to such factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his
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disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. Commissioner Thompson acknowledged
receipt of petitioner's COl\1PAS Risk Assessment, and noted that his risk of felony violence
is low, his criminal involvement is medium, but his reentry substance abuse is highly
probable. The Board afforded the petitioner ample opportunity to speak on his own behalf.
He claimed that he was remorseful for his actions, although he acknowledged that he did not
know the identity of the people in the vehicle that he hit, or even the number of people in the
vehicle. He provided his own explanation with regard to the reasons why he was removed
from the ASAT program. Commission Thompson inquired with regard to programs which

he had completed. He responded by indicating that he was attempting to obtain outside
clearance, working in the facility recycling program. The petitioner indicated that he has
been in the recycling business for a long time. The petitioner also indicated that he planned

on marrying his fiancee during the following month, and live with her and her son when
released.
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. The decision was sufficiently
detailed to i form the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the
requirements ofExecutive Law §259-i (see Matter ofSiao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 (2008]; Matter
ofWhitehead v. Russi, 201AD2d825 [3rd Dept., 1994]; Matter of Green v. New York State
Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 1993]). It is proper and, in fact, required, that
the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes (see Matter of Williams v
New York State Division of Parole,

supra~

Matter of Matos v New York State Board of
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Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 2011]; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd
Dept., 1996),-as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter ofFarid v Travis, 239 AD2d
629 [3rd Dept., 1997]; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 1998]). The
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the irunate1s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see
Matter of Davis v Evans, 105 AD3d 1305 [3d Dept., 2013]; Matter of MacKenzie v Evans,
95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 2012]; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, supra;
Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1681, 1681-1682 [3rd Dept.,
2010]). Nor must the Parole Board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first
sentence of Executive Law§ 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter ofSilvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d
859 [3rd Dept., 2006]).

In other words, "[w]here appropriate the Board may give

considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors; in determining whether the individual 'will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,' whether his or her 'release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,' and whether release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law"' (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 2004], quoting Executive Law §259-i [2) [c] [A], other citations
omitted). In this instance, the petitioner's criminal history includes six prior alcohol-related
driving convictions.
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a
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resentencing are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 751 [3rd Dept., 1996]; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 2001]; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13Misc3d1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 2006); Matter ofKalwasinski v Paterson,
80 AD3d l 065, 1066 [3d Dept., 2011]; Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d I 031, 1031 [3d
Dept., 2011]; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d I 054 [3d Dept., 2012]). The fact that
an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the _inmate a
protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter ofMotti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114,
1115 (3rd Dept., 2008]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether
release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum

term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000];

Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 (3d Dept., 2011];
Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 (3rd Dept., 2006] Iv denied 8 NY3 d 802
[2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 2007]).
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner and/or
provide

~idance

with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he

should engage in order to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no
merit (see Executive Law§ 259-i [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR § 8002.3; Matter of Francis v New York
State Division of Parole, 89AD3d 1312, 1313 [3d Dept., 2011]; Boothe v Hammock, 605
F2d 661 [2nd Cir, 1979]; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d
1174 [3rd Dept., 2005]).
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The Parole Board properly engaged in a risk and needs assessment as required under
Executive Law § 259-c ( 4 ), including review of the CO:rvIP AS instrument (see Matter of
DelrosariovEvans, supra; MatterofParteev Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, 1259 [3dDept., 2014],
lvdenied24NY3d 901 [ 2014]). "The COMPAS instrument, however, is only one factor that
the Board was required to consider in evaluating petitioner's request" (Matter of Matter of
Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107, 1109 (3d Dept., 2014]).
Lastly, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of

Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, supra, at 1364, citing Matter of Tatta v State of New
York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [20021).
The Court has reviewed and considered petitioner's remaining arguments and

contentions and finds them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
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This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220.

Counsel is not relieved from the applicable

provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
January 3 a> , 2015
Troy, New York

Dated:

Papers Considered:
1.
2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated October 30, 2014, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent's Answer dated January 9, 2015, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Affirmation of William Gannon, Esq., dated December 2, 2014 and
Exhibits
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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of ROBERT C. DUNCAN,
Petitioner,
-againstTINA M. STANFORD, CHAIRWOMAN of the,
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-14-ST6254 Index No. 5323-14 14
SEA,LING ORDER
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in

camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent's Exhibit B,
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent's Exhibit D, Inmate Status Report, Parts

II & III and Exhibit F, Compas Reentry Risk Assessment, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and
copies therc!of, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court.
ENTER
Dated:

January

3o , 2015

Troy, New York

eorge B. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

